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Abstract
The theory of the rm suggests that rms can respond to poor contract
enforcement by vertically integrating their production process. The purpose
of this paper is to examine whether rms' integration opportunities aect the
way institutions determine international trade patterns. We nd that verti-
cal integration lessens the impact of a country's ability to enforce contracts
on the comparative advantage of complex goods. We also nd that countries
with good nancial institutions export disproportionately more in sectors that
produce complex goods and that have a high propensity for vertical integra-
tion. In doing so we use a new outcome-based measure of vertical integration
propensity and we employ several empirical strategies: cross section, panel and
event study analysis. Our results conrm the role of institutions as source of
comparative advantage and suggest that this depends not only on the tech-
nological characteristics of the goods produced but also on the way rms are
able to organize the production process.
JEL Classication Codes: D23, F10, F14, G20, G34, L22, L23.
Keywords: International Trade, Comparative Advantage, Contract Enforce-
ment, Financial Institutions, Vertical Integration.
Corresponding author. Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, 10215 Stock-
holm, Sweden. Tel: +4686654500 Fax: +4686654599 Email: shon.ferguson@ifn.se
yDept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 11383 Stockholm, Swe-
den. Email: sara.formai@hhs.se.
zThis version is identical to the November 2010 Stockholm University Working Paper.
11 Introduction
A substantial body of empirical work has established that the quality of a country's
institutions has a profound eect on its economic performance. The impact of
institutions on economic outcomes was rst successfully estimated by Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), who showed that dierences in institutions have
a large eect on income per capita across countries. Rodrik et al (2004) showed that
institutions are more important than geography and trade in explaining dierences
in income per capita. Many authors pursued this topic further by focusing on the
role played by specic types of institutions in explaining cross-country dierences
in economic performance. The eect of nancial institutions was pioneered by King
and Levine (1993), who showed that a country's level of nancial development is a
signicant predictor of its future rate of economic growth. Knack and Keefer (1995)
and Mauro (1995) are among the rst who looked at the impact of specic measures
of property rights protection on investment and growth.
More recently increasing attention has been devoted to examine the impact of in-
stitutions on trade volumes and trade composition. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)
and Ranjan and Lee (2007) show that poor institutions, in the form of corruption
and imperfect contract enforcement, dramatically reduce international trade. Sev-
eral inuential works have studied and explored the idea that legal, nancial and
other types of institutions are indeed \inputs" to the production process and give
a nation a comparative advantage in industries relatively intensive in the use of the
services provided by these institutions. These papers show that institutional qual-
ity contributes to a country's comparative advantage in the same way as the more
traditional sources such as factor endowments and technology.
Evidence for the eect of legal institutions on comparative advantage is given
by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) who show that countries with better legal
systems export relatively more of \complex goods" that are more sensitive to poor
contract enforcement.1 The eect of nancial development on comparative advan-
tage was rst explored by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) who showed that nancial
development favours the specialization in sectors that are more dependent on ex-
ternal nancing. Manova (2008) showed that equity market liberalizations increase
exports disproportionately more in sectors that are more dependent on external
nance and employ fewer collateralizable assets.
One important matter that the above mentioned empirical contributions do not
1See Levchenko(2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) for a theoretical analysis.
2account for, however, is that rms may adapt their organizational form in order
to cope with the limitations of the institutional environment. Namely, rms can
respond to poor contract enforcement by vertically integrating their production
process. We thus test the hypothesis that vertical integration is a substitute for
good legal institutions when producing contract-intense goods. By accounting for
endogenous organizational form this allows us to better understand the eect of
legal institutions on the composition of exports.
The opportunity and the feasibility of vertical integration may rely on the quality
of nancial institutions too. A large body of work emphasizes the importance of -
nancial institutions but it oers ambiguous predictions on how nancial development
should aect internal organization of the rm in general, and vertical integration in
particular. One one hand, the lack of nancial development could reduce the pool of
potential entrepreneurs, limit rm entry and encourage the formation of large and
vertically integrated rms (Rajan and Zingales (1998), Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales
(1999)). On the other hand, it may be the case that credit market imperfections
limit incumbents' investment opportunities and prevent rms that would otherwise
like to vertically integrate from doing so (see, for example, McMillan and Woodru
(1999)). We weigh into this debate and provide evidence suggesting that credit
market imperfections adversely aect vertically integrated industries only if they
are contract-intense as well.
The interactions between nancial development, contract intensity, and the ex-
tent of vertical integration have been recently explored by Acemoglu et al (2009).
They nd greater vertical integration in countries that have both higher contract-
ing costs and more developed nancial markets. They also nd that countries with
higher contracting costs are more vertically integrated in more capital-intensive in-
dustries, arguing that capital-intensive industries are more susceptible to hold-up
problems. They do not investigate the consequences of this mechanism on trade,
however, which is the goal of the this paper.
In this paper, we investigate the eect of legal and nancial institutional quality
on comparative advantage across industries that vary in their complexity and their
propensity to vertically integrate. A complex good is dened as a good whose
production process is intensive in the use of highly specialized and customized inputs.
We measure industry complexity using Nunn's (2007) measure of contract intensity.
The trade of complex goods has grown substantially over the past three decades,
making its study all the more relevant for the modern economy. Figure 1 shows
that the export growth for the 20 most contract intense industries has outpaced the
3export growth of the 20 least contract intense industries over the period 1980-2000.
The main methodological contribution of this paper is that we use a new measure
of industry-level \vertical integration propensity" based on the observed vertical
integration outcomes from U.S. rm-level data. This measure has the advantage that
it is a direct measure of vertical integration based solely on sector characteristics. In
contrast, previous literature has used proxy measures such as the number-of-inputs.
We test two ways that vertical organization choice aects institution-driven com-
parative advantage in producing complex goods. First, we test if the benecial eect
of a country's legal institutional quality on its comparative advantage in complex
goods industries is diminished for industries that also have a high propensity to
vertically integrate. This should hold if rms are vertically integrating around the
problem of contract incompleteness resulting from poor legal institutions. Second,
we test whether or not nancial development within a country enhances the com-
parative advantage of complex goods industries that are more inclined to vertically
integrate. This should depend on whether good nancial institutions enable rms
to nance vertical integration and alleviate thus the hold up problem, more severe
in complex goods industries. These hypotheses thus test the role of incomplete
contract theory in explaining trade ows.
Our results show that there is a statistically signicant interaction between
institution-driven comparative advantage in complex goods and propensity to ver-
tically integrate. We rst test our hypotheses with a cross-section, which exploits
cross-country variation in institutional quality and cross-industry variation in com-
plexity and vertical integration propensity. We then test our hypotheses with panel
and event study analyses, exploiting the available time variation in nancial devel-
opment provided by capital account liberalizations that occurred in several countries
during the years 1984-2000. The cross-section is the ideal setting to examine the
eect of legal institutions, which vary very little over time, while the panel and event
study analyses lend themselves well to investigating the eect of nancial develop-
ment. In all our specications we control for other potential sources of comparative
advantage, such as factor endowments and the possibility that countries specialize
in dierent goods according to their level of development.
Our work relates to a recent paper that studies the interactions between nan-
cial constraints and contract incompleteness by Carluccio and Fally (2008). Using
import data of French multinational rms, they nd that nancial development gen-
erates a comparative advantage in the supply of complex goods and that imports
of complex inputs are more likely to occur within the bounds of the rm when the
4exporter's level of nancial development is lower. The purpose of Carluccio and
Fally's (2008) paper is to analyze intra-rm trade and the decision of rm to ver-
tically integrate only in relation with the institutional characteristics of the host
country. An implicit assumption is that rms face no nancial constraints coming
from the domestic institutional environment. In contrast, we concentrate on the
eect of domestic institutional quality on vertical integration regardless of whether
the vertical integration occurs across borders or not.
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical background is described in
section 2. Variable descriptions and data sources are discussed in section 3. The
methodology and results for the cross-section analysis, panel analysis and event
study are given in sections 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Conclusions follow in section 7.
2 Theoretical Background
The idea that countries with better legal institutions have a comparative advantage
in complex goods nds theoretical support in the incomplete contract literature.
The argument, pioneered by Williamson (1979) and further developed by Grossman
and Hart (1986), is the following: when contracts are not fully enforceable ex post,
the contracting parties tend to under-invest ex ante and this problem, the \ hold-
up problem", is bigger the more the investment is relationship-specic. Consider
the case of an up-stream rm (U) and a down-stream rm (D) that transact a
customized intermediate good. U's investments in customization and D's eort
in adapting its production process to use that specic input are both relationship-
specic because their value is higher within this buyer-seller relationship than outside
it. If the contract is not enforced and the trade agreement falls apart then U is
left with a good that has a lower value for any other buyer, while D will nd it
dicult to procure a good substitute from another supplier. Given such a risk both
parties in the transaction will under-invest in the relationship and the production
of the nal good will be inecient. The better legal institutions are the higher the
probability for the contract to be enforced and the lower the eciency loss due to
underinvestment. The resulting cost advantage will be greater the more important
relation-specic inputs are in the production of the nal good. From this it follows
that countries with better legal institutions have a comparative advantage in the
production of those goods intensive in relationship-specic inputs. Although this
hypothesis has found strong empirical support, it takes into account only part of the
theoretical predictions. The hold-up problem entails a transaction cost associated
5with market exchanges and, as Coase (1937) suggested, the transaction cost may
be avoided or reduced by choosing the optimal organizational structure. This idea
is fully developed by Williamson (1971,1979) who suggested vertical integration as
an organizational response to the hold-up problem.2 Williamson posits that moving
the transactions of the specic inputs inside the rm's boundaries should alleviate
the dependence on contract enforceability. If this is true then legal institutions
should have a lower eect in driving comparative advantage of complex goods when
the rms producing them can more easily vertical integrate. This is the the rst
hypothesis we test.
Given the propensity of rms belonging to a given industry to vertical integrate,
one may ask which country-specic characteristics actually make this a viable op-
tion. Acemoglu et al. (2009) argue and show that a stronger nancial development
is a prerequisite for rms to eciently integrate in response to high contracting
cost. Vertical integration, either if achieved via the acquisition of an existing sup-
plier or through the establishment of a new production plant, is a costly option and
may require access to external nance.3 If this argument is correct, good nancial
institutions should drive comparative advantage in those contract-dependent indus-
tries where it is easy to vertically integrate around the problem of weak contract
enforcement. This is the second hypothesis we test.
3 The Data
To examine the eect of legal and nancial institutions on comparative advantage we
combine data on countries' characteristics, industries' characteristics and countries'
exports by industry. We employ dierent sources depending on the type of analysis
and the time span we consider. For instance, the cross section analysis, mainly
based on the data set from Nunn (2007), uses observations for 1997 while the panel
and episode analysis use data for the period 1984-2000. This section illustrates
the sources and the denitions of our main variables. We refer the reader to the
appendix for a more complete description of the entire data set.
2The more sophisticated approach developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990) and known as the Property Rights Theory (PRT) emphasizes that transaction costs can
also be present in a vertical integrated structure. As a consequence, according to the PRT it
is not entirely clear whether relationship-specic investments should induce more or less vertical
integration. As noted by Lafontaine and Slade (2007), Williamson's transaction costs approach to
vertical integration, perhaps because of its more testable predictions, has stimulated much more
empirical work and has found considerable support in the data.
3See also McMillan and Woodru (1999) for evidence on rms in Vietnam.
63.1 Trade Flows and Institution Quality
Industry level data on trade ows are from Feenstra et al. (2005). We converted the
original data, classied by 4-digit SITC Rev.2 code, to the BEA's 1997 I-O industry
classication. For the cross section we have trade data for 222 industries and 159
countries, for the panel we have trade data for 206 industries and 176 countries over
the period 1984-2000.
The quality of legal institutions is measured by dierent variables according to
data availability. For the cross section, in line with Nunn (2007), we use the \rule
of law" from Kaufmann et al. (2008). This variable measures for each country the
extent to which agents have condence in the judiciary system and in law enforce-
ment. In the panel analysis we use a similar index, the \law and order", collected
by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and available for more years.
We dene the \quality of nancial institutions" as the ease for rms to obtain
external nancing. To capture this idea we use one continuous and two discrete
measures. The continuous measure, which we use in the cross section analysis, is
the amount of credit by banks and other nancial intermediaries to the private sector
as a share of GDP. This variable has been extensively used in the literature since it
represents an objective measure of the actual use of external funds and is therefore
an appropriate proxy for the economy potential to support nancial relationships.4
Table 1 shows that the \rule of law" measure and the ratio of credit to GDP
are positively correlated with countries' GDP per capita and their endowments of
physical and human capital. This highlights the importance of controlling for GDP
per capita and factor endowments in our analysis.
The discrete measures of nancial development are time-varying dummy vari-
ables that indicate the removal of equity market restrictions and are taken from
Bekaert et al. (2005). Removing equity market restrictions increases the availability
of external nance to rms (Mitton (2005) and has similar eects on the sectoral
composition of exports as a rise in domestic credit availability. Moreover, as Bekaert
et al. (2005) and others have argued, the exact timing of an equity market liberaliza-
tion is usually the outcome of complex political processes and is therefore exogenous
from the perspective of individual producers and potential exporters. We extended
the dataset on equity market liberalizations used by Manova (2008) using the up-
dated version of the data described in Bekaert et al. (2005). Our dataset lists
4See for example Rajan and Zingales (1998), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), Acemoglu et al.
(2009), Beck (2002, 2003)
7112 countries distinguishing among those that liberalized to foreign equity ows be-
fore, during or after the period 1980-2004. For each reforming country we consider
both the ocial year of equity market reform and the "rst sign" of liberalization.5
Our measures of nancial development are given by two dummy variables that are
equal to 1 in the year of and all the years after an ocial or rst sign of nancial
liberalization.
3.2 Contract Intensity
According to the theoretical framework we have in mind, the sensitivity of a given
industry to the quality of legal institutions is an exogenous industry characteristic
and it derives from the relative importance in the production process of those in-
puts that, due to some specicity, suer from hold-up problems. A direct measure
of such a variable does not exist and we use the proxy constructed and employed by
Nunn (2007). As an indicator of whether an input requires or not relation-specic
investments he considers Rauch's (1999) commodity classication. This consists
of three groups: goods traded on organized exchanges, goods not traded on orga-
nized exchanges but nevertheless possessing a reference price in trade publications,
and all other goods. Nunn denes an input as being relationship-specic if it is
neither purchased on an organized exchange nor reference-priced. Using this in-
formation, together with information from the 1997 U.S. I-O Table on input use,
Nunn constructs for each nal good the following measures of the proportion of its







where ij is the weight of input j in the production of the nal good i and Rneither
j is
the proportion of input j that is neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference
priced.6 A ranking of the ve least and ve highest contract intense industries is
given in Table 2.
Although there are several alternative measures of contract intensity in the lit-
erature, we choose Nunn's measure because it most clearly captures the problem of
5The rst-sign year is the earliest of three dates: ocial liberalization, American Depository
Recipt (ADR) announcement or rst country fund launch.
6Rauch's original classication groups goods into 1,189 industries according to the 4-digit SITC
Rev.2 Classication. Nunn aggregates these data into 342 industries following the BEA's I-O
industry classication. This explain why Rneither
j is a proportion and not simply a 0=1. We refer
to Nunn (2007) for a detailed description of the indicator and its construction.
8asset specicity with upstream suppliers. Levchenko (2007), for example, uses the
Herndahl index of intermediate input use as an inverse measure of product com-
plexity. The motivation for using the Herndahl index is that the more suppliers
a rm has and the less they are concentrated, the more the rm depends on legal
institutions because it has to deal with a higher number of equally important con-
tracts. Costinot (2009) instead bases its measure of complexity on survey data on
the length of time needed to become fully trained and qualied in a given industry.
Berkowitz et al. (2008) and Ranjan and Lee (2007) also use the data from Rauch
(1999) but they do so to classify the downstream industries according to their own
good's complexity, without looking at the type of intermediate inputs employed.
The correlation of the contract intensity measure (zi) with other industry vari-
ables is reported in Table 3. Contract intensity is positively correlated with human
capital intensity and, more surprisingly, negatively correlated with physical capital
intensity.7
3.3 Vertical Integration Propensity
In order to test whether rms' organization choice has an impact on the way insti-
tutions drive comparative advantage in complex goods we need an industry-specic
measure of the ease for rms to vertical integrate. Our measure of industries' propen-
sity to vertically integrate is taken from Acemoglu et al. (2009). As mentioned ear-
lier, they study the institutional determinants of vertical integration and in doing
so they use a large and detailed rm level data set from WorldBase. Combining
individual rms information with the U.S. I-O Table, they compute for each rm in
the sample the dollar value of inputs from industries in which the rm operates that
is required to produce one dollars worth of the rms primary output. They then
create a similar index also for secondary industries in which a rm is active. Each
rm's vertical integration index is then the average of these indices. For U.S. rms
only, they then regress this variable on a set of industry dummies and the resulting
estimates are direct measures of vertical integration propensity. These dummy co-
ecients represent the average level of vertical integration in each industry in the
U.S., where institutional constraints are likely to be slacker than everywhere else.
They thus devise an industry ranking of the average propensity of rms to vertically
integrate based solely on sector characteristics and derived from actual and observed
7The negative correlation between Nunn's measure of contract dependence and physical capital
intensity is particularly interesting. In fact, Acemoglu et al. (2009) used the industry's capital
intensity as proxy for the extent of the hold up problem.
9vertical integration outcomes.
To the best of our knowledge there is no variable in the literature that has ex-
tensively served as a measure of industry-level vertical integration propensity. Nunn
(2007) uses the number of inputs employed in the production process as a measure
of the diculty of vertical integration. The idea behind his choice is the following:
if there are xed costs in producing each single input, the total cost of integrate
the entire production chain in-house is increasing in the number of inputs required.
According to Lafontaine and Slade (2007), however, the empirical literature has
identied plenty of factors as possible determinants of vertical integration.8 More-
over, Nunn's argument views the decision to vertical integrate as a 0/1 choice: if a
rm vertically integrates it does it with all its suppliers. We argue that the Ace-
moglu et al. (2009) outcome-based measure captures a wider range of factors that
determine vertical integration and is thus most suitable for our study.
The only assumption we have to make, as for any other industry-specic variable,
is that our index is consistent across countries. It is the external validity of the
ranking that matters though, and not its absolute values.9 Our measure of vertical
integration propensity is thus given by 72 dummies that we match with the 222
Input-Output industries for which we have trade data.10.
Although our variable is a direct measure of vertical integration derived from
rm-level data, it could still be the case that it captures some other sector charac-
teristics. This is why in the empirical specications we control for many industry-
specic variables. The correlations between our vertical integration propensity mea-
sure (vii) and some of these variables is reported in Table 3. Vertical integration
propensity is positively correlated with physical capital intensity and negative cor-
related with industry value added. It's interesting to notice that the correlation
with Nunn's proxy for vertical integration (Ini) is not signicantly dierent from
zero. A ranking of the ve least and ve most vertically integrated industries in
the U.S. in 2003 is given in Table 4. It is interesting to note in Table 3 that the
correlation coecient between vertical integration propensity and Nunn's number-
of-inputs variable is very low (0.10) and not statistically signicant at the 1 percent
level. A ranking of industries with a combined low contract intensity and a low
8Lafontaine and Slade (2007) mention, for example, the presence of economies of scale or of
scope, the existence of uncertainty, monitoring costs or repeated interaction and the importance
of relationship-specic investments itself.
9See Rajan and Zingales (1998).
10Acemoglu et al (2009) estimate a total of 77 industry dummies based on the BEA's 1992 I-O
classication. See the appendix for more details.
10propensity to vertically integrate is given in Table 5.
4 Cross-section Analysis
4.1 Empirical Specication
We take three dierent approaches to measuring the eect of legal and nancial
institutions on trade: cross-section analysis, panel analysis and event study. We
begin our analysis using a cross-section methodology. The goal of the cross-section
analysis is to exploit the variation in institutional quality across countries. This
is particularly useful for the case of legal institutions since there is very little time
variation in the measures of legal institutional quality that we employ.
We test our hypotheses by estimating the following equation:
Tci = 0 + 1 (ziQc) + 2 (ziQcvii) + 3 (ziCRcvii) + 4 (ziCRc) (1)
+5 (Qcvii) + 6 (CRcvii) + Xci + c + i + "ci.
Tci is the log value of country c's exports to the rest of the world in industry i. Qc
is legal institutional quality, proxied by the \Rule of Law" index from Kaufmann
et al. (2000). CRc is nancial institutional quality, which is proxied by the log
of credit by banks and other nancial institutions to the private sector as a share
of GDP. zi is Nunn's (2007) industry-specic measure of contract intensity, while
vii is Acemoglu et al.'s (2009) measure of vertical integration propensity. Xci is a
vector of country-industry interaction controls, while c and i denote country xed
eects and industry xed eects respectively. In this equation exports are explained
by interactions of an industry characteristic with a country characteristic. This
specication was rst used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to test whether industries
that are more dependent on external nancing are growing faster in countries with
better developed nancial markets.
Note that this specication measures the eect of country characteristics and
industry characteristics on the composition of trade, not the total volume of trade.
The eect of country characteristics such as institutional quality Qc on the volume
of trade is captured here by the country xed eects. This formulation is thus
conceptually distinct from studies such as Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) that use
a gravity model to measure the eect of institutional quality on the total volume of
trade in all sectors of an economy.
11Nunn's (2007) hypothesis was that countries with better contract enforcement
have a comparative advantage in producing nal goods that use intensively inputs
requiring relationship-specic investments. This is indicated by a positive coecient
for 1, and means that countries with better contract enforcements will specialize in
contract-intensive industries. The vii variable is standardized with a mean of zero,
so we can interpret 1 as the eect of judicial quality on comparative advantage for
an industry with the mean level of vertical integration propensity.
Our analysis focuses on the triple-interactions in equation (1), since we are inter-
ested in how institution-driven comparative advantage in complex goods interacts
with an industry's propensity to vertically integrate. Consider the rst triple inter-
action term, ziQcvii. A negative coecient for 2 implies that the eect of contract
enforcement on comparative advantage in contract-intensive industries is diminished
when the industry can easily vertically integrate. Vertically integrating around the
problem of contract incompleteness thus reduces the necessity of good judicial in-
stitutions for producing complex goods. Consider now the second triple interaction,
ziCRcvii. A positive coecient for 3 means that a country with ecient nancial
institutions will have a comparative advantage in producing contract-intense goods
whose production process can protably be vertical integrated. In other words,
good nancial institutions are important for rms producing complex goods and
belonging to industries characterized by a high degree of vertical integration. Other
interaction terms are also included, such as ziCRc, Qcvii and CRcvii. These control
interactions are not the focus of the analysis but we report them in all regressions
nonetheless. Additional control variables include the typical sources of comparative
advantage, physical capital and human capital.
All industry-specic variables in the analysis are taken from U.S. data. Identi-
cation thus requires that the ranking of sectors in terms of contract intensity, vertical
integration propensity, and other industry-specic controls remains relatively stable
across countries.
4.2 Cross-Section Results
The results of the cross-section are presented in Tables 6 and 7. We estimate equa-
tion (1) using Nunn's (2007) dataset of 70 countries and 182 industries in the year
1997. Using Nunn's data allows us to directly compare our results with his original
results.
Table 6 focuses on legal institutions only. As in Nunn (2007), we nd that the
12coecient for judicial quality interaction, ziQc, is positive and statistically signif-
icant across all columns of Table 6. We also observe that the coecient for the
triple interaction, ziQcvii, is negative and statistically signicant across all columns.
These results support our hypothesis that legal institutions are less important for
comparative advantage within industries for which vertical integration is relatively
easy. While Nunn (2007) tested this hypothesis using the number of inputs as an in-
verse measure of the ease of vertical integration, we use use Acemoglu et al.'s (2009)
observed industry-level vertical integration outcomes in the U.S. as our measure of
vertical integration propensity.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 do not include any controls for alternative sources
of comparative advantage or industry characteristics. The only dierence between
columns (1) and (2) is the number of observations. Column (1) uses the unrestricted
sample, while column (2) is restricted to using the same observations as column
(4), which is lower due to limitations in data availability for the control variables.
Restricting the sample only aects the coecients slightly.
Controlling for traditional sources of comparative advantage in column (3) does
not change the main results. We report standardized beta coecients in all spec-
ications, which allows us to directly compare the relative size of the coecients.
We observe that the eect of judicial quality has a greater impact on comparative
advantage than human or physical capital. According to the estimate in column
(3), a one standard deviation increase in the judicial quality interaction increases
exports by .28 standard deviations. In contrast, a simultaneous one standard devi-
ation increase in the physical capital and human capital interactions increases log
exports by a combined .17 standard deviations. The judicial quality-vertical inte-
gration triple interaction also has a large coecient, with a one standard deviation
increase in vertical integration propensity reduces the eect of the judicial quality
interaction by .09 standard deviations.
We control for other determinants of trade ows in column (4) of Table 5. Log
income per capita is interacted with industry measures for share of value-added
in shipment, intra-industry trade and TFP growth in the previous twenty years.
These interactions control for the possibility that, for reasons unrelated to contract
enforcement, high-income countries have a comparative advantage in high value-
added industries, industries with a high degree of fragmentation of the production
process or a rapid rate of technological progress. The nal control in column (4)
interacts log income with one minus the Herndahl index of input concentration.
Clague (1991a,b) argues that the Herndahl index measures how \self contained"
13an industry is, and that less developed countries tend to specialize in industries that
are relatively more \self contained". This interaction thus controls for the possibility
that high-income countries will specialize in industries that are less \self contained".
All control interactions are statistically signicant with the expected sign.11
The judicial quality interactions and controls in Table 7 are the same as Ta-
ble 6, but nancial institution quality interactions and additional controls are also
included. All columns of Table 7 are restricted to the same set of observations.
The original judicial quality interaction and the judicial quality-vertical integration
interaction continue to be signicant with the expected sign across all columns.
This implies that legal and nancial institutions, although their measures are highly
correlated, have separate roles in aecting international trade patterns.
The coecient of the nancial quality-vertical integration triple interaction,
ziCRcvii, is signicant with a positive sign across all columns of Table 7. This
result supports the hypothesis that good nancial institutions are relatively more
important for industries that produce complex goods and where rms tend to be
vertically integrated. At the same time, our control interaction between product
complexity and nancial institution quality, ziCRc, is positive and signicant. This
result is robust across all the specications we will consider in our study. It is also
worth noticing that the eect of good nancial institutions is increasing with the
industry's vertical integration propensity (CRcvii positive and signicant in all the
specications). This seems to suggest that nancial development is particularly ben-
ecial to industries where rms tend to be large and integrated. This result won't be
robust to the more demanding econometric strategies employed in the next sections,
proving to be just a spurious correlation.
No controls are included in column (1), while control interactions are successively
added in columns (2), (3) and (4). Column (2) includes controls for traditional
sources of comparative advantage and industry characteristics interacted with log
income. All of the controls in column (2) are signicant with the exception of the
TFP interaction.
Two additional control interactions are included in column (3). The rst controls
for the importance of nancial development in capital-intense industries, kiCRc.
The second controls the importance of nancial development in industries that are
growing quickly, tfpiCRc. The inclusion of these controls is motivated by previous
11As an additional robustness check, available upon request, we also added to all the specications
of Table 6 an interaction of our measure of good complexity with the index of patent protection
available in Park (2008). Our result are robust to the inclusion of this variable whose coecient is
positive and signicant.
14studies on nancial development and export composition and the possibility that
zivii captures some other source of nancial dependence that has nothing to do with
contract intensity and organizational choice. Both of these controls are statistically
signicant with the expected sign. Nonetheless, our triple interactions are robust to
these controls.
Two more control interactions are included in column (4) to test whether other
country characteristics, rather than judicial quality, cause countries to specialize in
the production of complex goods. We do this by interacting zi with the country-
level characteristics of physical and human capital abundance. The coecient for
the ziKc control is positive and signicant at the 5% level, but the coecient for
the ziHc control is negative and signicant only at the 10% level. Overall, our
signicant and economically meaningful results for the triple interactions, ziQcvii
and ziCRcvii, are robust to a wide array of controls in the cross-section data.12 13
The eect of vertical integration on the response of complex goods to institutional
quality is economically signicant. Take the hypothetical case of Cambodia improv-
ing its Rule of Law Ranking to that of South Korea, which would entail moving from
the 25th percentile of the Rule of Law country ranking to the 75th percentile. The
point estimates in column 4, Table 7 indicate that complex goods exports (75th per-
centile of the complexity ranking) would rise by 39 percentage points in Cambodia's
low-VI industries but only 5 percentage points in its high-VI industries (comparing
the 25th vs. 75th percentile of the VI ranking). Similarly, if Burundi (25th per-
centile) improved its credit/GDP ratio to that of South Korea (75th percentile), the
point estimates suggest that Burundi's exports of complex goods would increase by
64 percentage points for high-VI industries versus 44 percentage points for low-VI
industries.
We complement our regression results with a graphical analysis of how the
marginal eects of legal and nancial institutions on trade vary with industry char-
acteristics. Derivation of (1) illustrates that these marginal eects are a function of
industry-level contract intensity and vertical integration propensity:
@Tci
@Qc
= zi(1 + 2vii) + 5vii
12We also nd signicant results when using the \net interest margin" from Beck et al. (2000)
as our proxy for nancial development and when we substitute the \rule of law" with alternative
measures of contract enforcement. See the data appendix for more details.
13In an additional robustness check available upon request, we conrm in in the cross-section
specication that the vii variable is not simply a proxy for labor-intensity, measured as the ratio
of total wages to value-added.
15@Tci
@CRc
= zi(4 + 3vii) + 6vii + 1ki + 2tfpi:
We cannot capture the true marginal eects because some of the eects of institu-
tions are absorbed by the country dummies. This is not a problem though since
we are interested in knowing how the marginal eects dier across industries that
vary in contract intensity and vertical integration propensity. The connection be-
tween these industry characteristics and the marginal eects is illustrated in gures
2 and 3 respectively. Figure 2 shows that the marginal eect of legal institutions is
increasing with contract intensity for industries that have a low propensity to ver-
tically integrate. However, there is no relationship between the marginal eect and
contract intensity for industries that have a high propensity to vertically integrate.
A similar pattern is found for the marginal eect of nancial institutions in gure 3.
The marginal eect of nancial institutions is increasing with contract intensity for
industries with both low and high propensity to vertically integrate, but the eect
is larger for high-VI sectors.
The cross-section approach is appropriate for analyzing the eect of judicial qual-
ity on comparative advantage since there is so little time variation in the available
proxies of countries' judicial institution quality. Reverse causality is still an issue
though, since it may be that countries that already export contract-intense goods
have an incentive to improve their contract enforcement or nancial institutions.14
As for our measure of nancial institutional quality, it goes without saying that the
ratio of private bank credit to GDP is an outcome variable. Our results thus can
only be interpreted as interesting correlations but to not indicate a causal relation-
ship between institutional quality and comparative advantage. We address these
concerns in the panel analysis and event study by following Manova (2008) and us-
ing episodes of equity market liberalization as a source of exogenous variation in the
supply of outside nance.
Several authors have attempted to use an instrument for institutional quality in
order to isolate the causal impact of institutions on comparative advantage. Nunn
(2007), for instance, attempts to use countries' legal origins as an instrument for legal
institutions. As our analysis examines two dierent types of institutions, it requires
separate instruments for legal institutional quality and nancial development. Since
legal origin likely aects both contract enforcement and nancial development it
is not a suitable instrument for either type of institution. Given the lack of good
14See Do and Levchenko (2007) for the causal eect of comparative advantage on nancial
development.
16instruments we elect to exploit the shocks in nancial liberalization instead.
Another issue with the cross-section is that it may suer from the problem of
missing variables. Although we include several country-industry controls, there may
be unobserved country-industry interaction terms that bias our results. The panel




The goal of the panel analysis is to exploit the sudden shocks to nancial devel-
opment that occurred in several countries between 1984 and 2000 in order to help
alleviate the problem of reverse causality that we have in our cross-section analysis.
Data on nancial market liberalizations from Bekaert et al. (2005) provides us with
a source of variation in nancial development that we exploit in both the panel data
and later in the event study approach. We use a generalized dierence in dierence
methodology similar to Manova (2008) and estimate the following equation:
Tcit = 0 + 1 (ziL&Oct) + 2 (ziL&Octvii) + 3 (ziLib dumctvii) (2)
+4 (ziLib dumct) + Xcit + ci + t + "cit.
Here the dependent variable, Tcit, is the log value of country c's exports to the
rest of the world in industry i in year t. The proxy for legal institutional quality,
L&Oct, is the \Law and Order" indicator from the ICRG. We use this measure
of legal institutional quality because it is available for more years than the \Rule
of Law" measure. Lib dumct is the nancial liberalization dummy variable, which
takes a value of 1 the year of and all years after a nancial liberalization in country
c and 0 otherwise. Xcit is a vector of controls, while ci and t denote country-
industry and time xed eects respectively. By using country-industry xed eects
we control for all time-constant factors that are related to a particular industry in
a particular country. Together with the time xed eects this means that we are
left with industry-year, country-year, and industry-country-year interaction terms.
Identication is thus made using purely the time variation in institutional quality.
We are interested in the same triple-interactions in equation (2) as we were in
17the cross-section approach. The interpretation of the triple interaction coecients
is identical to the cross-section case. A negative coecient for 2 implies that
legal institutional quality is not as important for specialization in contract-intensive
industries when it is relatively easy for these industries to vertically integrate around
the problem of contract incompleteness. A positive coecient for 3 means that a
country will have a comparative advantage in producing contract-intense goods in
a vertically-integrated production process if nancial institutions are strong.
The panel analysis includes many of the same control interaction terms as the
cross-section, plus all the variables that vary over time since they are not subsumed
by the country-industry xed eects. This includes country-specic legal and -
nancial institutional quality, physical and human capital, and log income. Almost
all industry-specic variables in the panel analysis are time-constant. The only
time-varying industry variable is total factor productivity growth, which is both
interacted with log income and included on its own.
As Manova (2008) states, the estimates in equation (2) may be an underesti-
mation of the true eect if trade increases in the anticipation of a nancial or legal
reform. Anticipation of the reforms may be occurring, but this downward bias serves
to strengthen our results since we nd large and statistically signicant eects.
5.2 Panel Results
Our panel incorporates data from 76 countries and 153 industries over the years
1984-2000. An advantage with the panel approach is that it allows us to combine
data from reforming countries with data on non-reformers. 39 countries in the panel
that undertake a reform of their capital account during the time period we study.
Of the remaining countries in our sample, 20 have closed capital accounts over the
entire timespan of our panel and 19 have fully liberalized capital accounts prior to
1984.
The results of the panel analysis are presented in Table 8. We use two dierent
ways of dening the timing of the nancial liberalizations. Columns (1) and (2) use
the ocial year of nancial liberalization, while columns (3) and (4) use the year
of the rst sign of liberalization. Both of these interpretations of the timing of the
nancial liberalization are taken from Bekaert et al. (2005). All columns include
all possible interactions of country-specic legal and nancial development with
industry-specic complexity and vertical integration propensity. The only control
included in columns (1) and (3) is real GDP per capita, while several more controls
18are added in columns (2) and (4). We observe that the judicial quality interaction,
ziL&Oct, is now weakly signicant. Given the lack of time variation in the Law and
Order variable, it's remarkable that ziL&Oct is still signicant at the 10 percent
level in 2 out of 4 our very demanding specications.15 The judicial quality-vertical
integration triple interaction, ziL&Octvii, is insignicant in all columns of Table 8.
The lack of signicance may be a symptom of a lack of time variation in the Rule
of Law variable. However, the insignicant coecient for ziL&Octvii may instead
suggest that vertical integration propensity does not reduce the problem of contract
incompleteness when nancial development is also poor (Lib dumct = 0).
The coecient attached to the nancial quality-vertical integration triple in-
teraction, ziLib dumctvii, is positive and signicant across all columns of Table
8. The strongest results are found using the rst sign of liberalization, which is
probably better in capturing the eect of liberalizations in case the actual reforms
have either delayed or anticipated eects. The statistically signicant coecient for
ziLib dumctvii lends support for the hypothesis that good nancial institutions are
required in complex industries that have a higher propensity to vertically integrate.
As mentioned already, the vertical integration-nancial development interaction
term, Lib dumctvii in Table 8, is now insignicant. This result conrms the ambi-
guity suggested by the theoretical literature: better nancial institutions can both
foster entry and the development of small rms (low-vii sectors) but also boost
investments and the growth of big and integrated rms (high-vii sectors). What
matters in our analysis is that, when we restrict the attention to high-z sectors, the
eect becomes positive and signicant, because we isolate only the second of the two
mechanisms. Complex good industries thus benet the most from better nancial
institutions when they facilitate vertical integration required to avoid the hold-up
problem.
The panel results complement the cross-section analysis by illustrating that -
nancial development eects comparative advantage not only across countries but
also within the same country over time.
15The lack of time variation is a problem common to many measures of governance or institution
quality, especially if based on survey data. See Kaufmann et al. (2008).
196 Event Study
6.1 Empirical Specication
While the panel approach succeeds in measuring the eect of changes in nancial
development within countries over time, it does not take a rm stand on the number
of years it takes for a nancial liberalization to aect exports. On the one hand this
allows for exibility but on the other hand it prohibits us from measuring how
quickly the nancial reforms show up in the export data. We thus complement the
panel analysis with an event study approach following Treer (2004) and Manova
(2008). Let t = 0 the time period before a liberalization event and t = 1 the time
period after a liberalization event. We obtain the event study regression equation
by rst-dierencing equation (2):
Tci = Tci1   Tci0 (3)
= 1 (ziL&Oct) + 2 (ziL&Octvii) + 3 (zivii)
+4 (zi) + Xcit + "cit.
Note that the constant term 0 and the country-industry and time xed eects have
dropped out of the regression equation. We include the rst-dierenced judicial
quality interactions because we want to control for changes in legal institution quality
that occur at the same time as the nancial reforms. Note that the the eects may be
underestimated since Tci0 includes any response in exports to an anticipated reform.
6.2 Event Study Results
We estimate (3) using the same set of nancial reforms as the panel analysis. The
event study only uses the 39 reforming countries since the other 35 non-reformers
drop out due to rst-dierencing. Note that there is only one observation for every
country-industry combination. All regressions include liberalization year xed ef-
fects in order to control for changes in exports that may result from macroeconomic
uctuations. We rst measure Tci as the dierence in the log of average exports
between (t + 1;t + 3) and (t   1;t   3). All time-varying independent variables are
dierenced in the same manner, taking the dierence between the three year average
before and after the year of the nancial liberalization event.
The results of the event study are presented in Table 9. We nd signicant ef-
20fects even when using this econometrically demanding setup. The statistical signi-
cance of the coecient for the nancial quality-vertical integration triple interaction,
ziL&Octvii depends on the controls used and the denition of the nancial reform.
Without controls the coecient is the expected sign and statistically signicant at
the 5% and 10% levels using the rst sign of liberalization and ocial liberalization
respectively. Adding controls and country dummes in columns (3) and (6) does not
aect signicance levels.
As a robustness check we used an alternative time period measure and dened
Tci as the dierence in the log of average exports between t + 4 and t   1. The
results using this alternative time horizon are also statistically signicant. The
coecients are also similar in size, which suggests that the composition of exports
did not change in anticipation of the reform.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to show that organizational form matters when mea-
suring the eect of institutional quality on comparative advantage. We argue that
rms can circumvent the hold-up problem by vertically integrating with suppliers,
and that vertical integration requires well-functioning nancial markets. These ef-
fects will be most pronounced in complex industries that are most susceptible to the
hold-up problem. We tested these hypotheses using data for several countries that
dier in institutional quality and several industries that dier in their complexity
and propensity to vertically integrate.
Overall, the three dierent empirical strategies that we employ indicate a signi-
cant relationship between institutional quality, organizational choice and the exports
of complex goods. The cross-section was the most ideal way to measure the eect
of judicial quality since the variation in contract enforcement exists across countries
but not within countries over the time period of our sample. Financial develop-
ment varies both across countries and within countries over time, allowing us to nd
signicant results in all three specications.
Our results suggest that organizational form matters when measuring the eect
of institutions on comparative advantage. Our results conrm the role of institutions
as source of comparative advantage and suggest that this depends not only on the
technological characteristics of the goods produced but also on the way rms are
capable to organize the production process.
21Appendix
A Detailed Data Description
Industry level data on trade ows are from the World Trade database [Feenstra et
al. (2005)]. The data are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars and are originally
classied by the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system. We map the data to the BEA 1997 I-O
classication system using the SITC to HS10 concordance tables by Jon Haveman
and the concordance from HS10 to the I-O system available from the BEA. When an
SITC category maps into multiple I-O categories we pick the more frequent match in
terms of the number of HS10 categories linking each SITC and I-O category. When
an SITC category maps equally into two or more I-O categories, then the choice of
I-O category was made manually.
Our rst measure of judicial quality is the \rule of law" and it is from Kaufmann
et al. (2008). The variable, using surveys data collected in 1997 and 1998, measures
the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The original variable ranges
from -2.5 to +2.5 but we use the variable as rescaled from 0 to 1 by Nunn (2007).
The other variable we use is the \law and order" from the International Country Risk
Guide. Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising
zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of
popular observance of the law. For this variable we have data from 1984 to 2000.
As robustness checks, in the cross section analysis we replace the \rule of law" with
other measures of contract enforcement. \Legal quality" is from Gwartney and
Lawson (2003). It is an index from 1 to 10 that measures the legal structure and the
security of property rights. Data on the \number of procedures", \ocial costs",
and \time" required to collect an overdue debt are from the World Bank (2009).
Our rst measure for capital market development is the commonly used amount
of credit by banks and other nancial institutions to the private sector as a share
of GDP. The source is the \World Development Indicators". The second data set
for nancial development comes from Bekaert et al. (2005). In an ongoing project
Bekaert and Hervey are collecting data for \A Chronology of Important Financial,
Economic and Political Events in Emerging Markets".16 For the countries surveyed
16See http://web.duke.edu/ charvey/Country risk/chronology/chronology index.htm
22the authors date both the ocial year of nancial market reforms and the \rst sign"
of liberalization. This rst sign year is the earliest of three dates: ocial liberaliza-
tion, rst American Depository Receipt (ADR) announcement or rst country fund
launch. We construct post-liberalization dummies that equal 1 in the year of and
all years after an ocial or rst-sign liberalization. The data as used by Manova
(2008) are available for 91 countries between 1980 and 1997. We extended this list
up to 112 countries according to the most updated information made available by
Bekaert and Hervey on their web site. As a robustness check to the cross section
analysis we substitute the private credit over GDP with the net interest margin.
This is a proxy for the wedge between prices faced by the parties on either side of a
loan transaction. The source is Beck et al. (2000).
Annual real GDP is from the Penn World Tables. The stock of physical capital
per capita is constructed according to the perpetual inventory method using data on
population, investment share and real GDP from the Penn World Tables. Human
capital per worker is calculated from the average years of schooling in a country
with Mincerian non-linear returns to education. Average years of schooling come
from Barro and Lee (2001).
Contract intensity comes from Nunn (2007). It measures the proportion of an
industry's inputs, weighted by value, that require relationship-specic investments
in their production. More details on the construction of this variable are in the text
and in Nunn (2007).
Vertical integration propensity comes from Acemoglu et al. (2009). For each
rm in their data-set they know up to ve sectors j in which the rm operates and
which one is the primary sector of activity, i. The vertical integration index of rm









where Nf is the set of industries in which rm is active, jNfj denotes the number of
these industries and V Ihj the entry of he I-O table for input h in producing 1$ of
output j. As explained in the text, the index is the average among the jNfj sectors
of activity of the input requirements produced in-house. Looking only at US rms
(i.e. c = USA) they run the following regression
vUSAif = di + if
23where the dis are 72 industry dummies and their estimate our measure for vertical
integration propensity. Acemoglu et al.(2009) use the BEA's 1992 I-O Table clas-
sication at a 2-digit level of aggregation. We matched their data with our 4-digit
1997 I-O Table classication using the concordances I-O 92-SIC 87-HS10-I-O 97.
The sources for the concordance tables are again Jon Haveman's and BEA's web
sites.
All the other industry-specic data are from Nunn (2007). Data on factor in-
tensities of production, industry value added and TFP growth were originally from
Bartelsman and Gray (1996) and are all based on U.S. data. The TFP growth data
is converted from NAICS to the 1997 I-O industry classication using the BEA
concordance. Capital intensity is measured as the total real capital stock in each in-
dustry divided by the value added and skill intensity as the ratio of non-production
worker wages to total wages. Value added is given by total value added of each sec-
tor divided by the total value of shipments. TFP growth is averaged over the period
1976 and 1996. Intra industry trade and Herndahl index of input concentration
are constructed by Nunn. Intra-industry trade is the amount of intra-industry trade
in each industry according to the Grubel-Lloyd index for the United States in 1997.
The Herndahl index of input concentration is constructed from the 1997 U.S. I-O
Use Table.
























































































































































































































































Source: Feenstra et al (2005), Nunn (2007)


































































































































































































Notes: Marginal eects derived from the regression provided in column (4) of Table 7

































































































































































































Notes: Marginal eects derived from the regression provided in column (4) of Table 7
Table 1: Correlations of Country-Level Variables
Qc CRc Hc Kc Yc
Qc 1.00
CRc 0.75* 1.00
Hc 0.68* 0.63* 1.00
Kc 0.73* 0.69* 0.84* 1.00
Yc 0.83* 0.75* 0.84* 0.92* 1.00
Notes: Correlation coecients are reported.
* indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.Table 2: The Five Least and Five Most Contract-Intense Industries
Least contract intensive Most contract intensive
1. Poultry processing 1. Automobile & light truck manuf.
2. Flour milling 2. Heavy duty truck manuf.
3. Wet corn milling 3. Electronic computer manuf.
4. Aluminum sheet, plate & foil manuf. 4. Audio & video equipment manuf.
5. Primary aluminum production 5. Other computer peripheral equip.
manuf.
Notes: Industry description are based on BEA 1997 6-digit I-O classications
Table 3: Correlations of Industry-Level Variables
zi vii Ini hi ki vai
zi 1.00
vii -0.35* 1.00
Ini 0.16 0.10 1.00
hi 0.44* -0.08 0.23* 1.00
ki -0.49* 0.33* 0.02 -0.23* 1.00
vai 0.32* -0.32* -0.07 0.26* -0.45* 1.00
Notes: \In" is the inverse measure of vertical integration used
by Nunn (2007). Correlation coecients are reported.
* indicates signicance at the 1 percent level.
28Table 4: The Five Least and Five Most Vertically Integrated Industries, U.S., 2003
Least vertically integrated Most vertically integrated
1. Health/education services 1. Mining, nonferrous
2. Maintenance construction 2. Petroleum & gas
3. Furniture, household 3. Leather
4. Household appliances 4. Livestock
5. Automotive service 5. Amusement
Notes: Industry description are based on BEA 1992 2-digit I-O classications
Table 5: Industries With Lowest and Highest Combined Contract Intensity and
Vertical Integration Propensity
Combined Lowest Combined Highest
1. Poultry processing 1. Electronic computer manuf.
2. Flour milling 2. Other electronic component manuf.
3. Wet corn milling 3. Cut & sew apparel manuf.
4. Petroleum reneries 4. Accessories & other apparel manuf.
5. Rice milling 5. Accessories & Audio & video equip.
manuf.
Notes: Industry description are based on BEA 1997 6-digit I-O classications
29Table 6: Cross-Section, Legal Institution Only
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ziQc 0.252 0.282 0.284 0.241
(0.011)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)***
ziQcvii -0.047 -0.098 -0.088 -0.074
(0.014)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
Qcvii -0.009 -0.063 -0.072 -0.081











(1   hfi)Yc 0.544
(0.106)***
Observations 20352 9776 9776 9776
R2 0.718 0.753 0.754 0.758
Notes: Standardized beta coecients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets
Dependent Variable: Industry-Level Exports. Legal Institution Measure: Rule of Law. All
regressions include a constant term, exporter and industry xed eects. ***, ** and *
indicate signicance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels.
30Table 7: Cross Section, Legal Institution & Credit
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ziQc 0.145 0.112 0.102 0.086
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.034)**
ziQcvii -0.134 -0.127 -0.123 -0.121
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
ziiCRc 0.094 0.090 0.107 0.096
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
ziiCRcvii 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.029
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)**
Qcvii -0.146 -0.159 -0.144 -0.146
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
CRcvii 0.049 0.047 0.033 0.033
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
hiHc 0.064 0.053 0.048 0.052
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.020)***
kiKc 0.122 0.097 0.021 0.054
(0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.043) (0.048)
vaiYc -0.200 -0.183 -0.185
(0.072)*** (0.072)** (0.072)**
iitiYc 0.471 0.466 0.463
(0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.061)***
tfpiYc 0.032 -0.129 -0.136
(0.053) (0.076)* (0.077)*










Observations 9762 9700 9700 9700
R2 0.755 0.758 0.759 0.759
Notes: Standardized beta coecients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets
Dependent Variable: Industry-Level Exports. Legal Institution Measure: Rule of Law.
Credit Measure: Private Credit/GDP. All regressions include a constant term, exporter
and industry xed eects. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
levels.
31Table 8: Panel Regression, Country-Industry and Year Fixed Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ocial Lib. Date Ocal Lib. Date First Sign of Lib. First Sign of Lib.
ziL&Oct 0.039 0.025 0.055 0.036
(0.023)* (0.021) (0.023)** (0.021)*
ziL&Octvii -0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ziLib dumctvii 0.011 0.014 0.019 0.021
(0.006)* (0.006)** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
ziLib dumct 0.040 0.029 0.034 0.024
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
L&Octvii 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.019
(0.011) (0.012)* (0.010) (0.011)*
Lib dumctvii 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
L&Oct -0.013 -0.015 -0.008 -0.010
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Lib dumct 0.040 0.036 0.034 0.029
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)** (0.013)**
RGDPct 0.361 0.083 0.373 0.090



















Observations 126505 126505 126505 126505
R2 0.321 0.328 0.319 0.326
Notes: Standardized beta coecients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. Dependent Variable: Industry-Level
Exports. Legal Institution Measure: Law and Order. All regressions include a constant term, exporter-industry xed eects,
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